Abstract. Berkovitz's notion of strategy and payoff for differential games is extended to study two player zero-sum infinite dimensional differential games on the infinite horizon with discounted payoff. After proving dynamic programming inequalities in this framework, we establish the existence and characterization of value. We also construct a saddle point for the game.
Introduction
In [1] , Berkovitz has introduced a novel approach to differential games of fixed duration. He has extended this framework to cover games of generalized pursuitevasion [2] and games of survival [3] in finite dimensional spaces. Motivated by these developments we define strategies and payoff for infinite horizon discounted problems whose state is governed by a controlled semi-linear evolution equation in a Hilbert space. In this setup, we show the existence of value and then characterize it as the unique viscosity solution of the associated HamiltonJacobi-Isaacs (HJI for short) equation. To achieve this, we follow a dynamic programming method and hence we differ from Berkovitz's approach for finite horizon problems [4] . We also establish the existence of a saddle point for the game by constructing it in a feedback form.
f (x, µ, ν) :=

V U f (x, u, v) µ(du) ν(dv).
For µ(·) ∈Ũ and ν(·) ∈Ṽ , the state equation in the relaxed control framework is given byẋ
(t) + Ax(t) =f (x(t), µ(t), ν(t)) ; x(0)
Since f satisfies (A1), it follows thatf also satisfies (A1) with u ∈ U, v ∈ V replaced respectively by µ ∈ P(U ), ν ∈ P(V ). Therefore for each x 0 ∈ E, µ(·) ∈Ũ and ν(·) ∈Ṽ , the existence and uniqueness of a global mild solution to (2.2) 
follows analogously. This solution is called a relaxed trajectory and is denoted by ψ(·, x 0 , µ(·), ν(·)).
We now begin the description of the game by defining the strategies of players. A strategy for player 1 is a sequence = { n } of partitions of [0, ∞), with n → 0, and a sequence = { n } of instructions described as follows: Let n = {0 = t 0 < t 1 < · · · }. The nth stage instruction n is given by a sequence { n,j } ∞ j =1 , where n,1 ∈ U[t 0 , t 1 ) and for j ≥ 2, 
DIFFERENTIAL GAMES FOR ABSTRACT EVOLUTION EQUATIONS
Similarly, a strategy for player 2 is a sequence¯ = {¯ n } of partitions of [0, ∞), with ¯ n → 0, and a sequence = { n } of instructions described as follows:
Let¯ n = {0 = s 0 < s 1 We suppress the dependence of the sequence of partitions on a strategy and, by an abuse of notation, denote a strategy by or . In what follows stands for a strategy for player 1 and stands for a strategy for player 2.
Note that a pair ( n , n ) of nth stage instructions uniquely determines a pair (u n (·), v n (·)) ∈ U × V as follows. Letˆ n = {0 = r 0 < r 1 < · · · } be the common refinement of n and¯ n . The control functions u n (·) and v n (·) are given by the sequences (u n, 1 
, where l is the greatest integer such that s l ≤ r j and s l = r j .
If
, where k is the greatest integer such that t k ≤ r j and t k = r m .
The pair (u n (·), v n (·)) determined this way is called the nth stage outcome of the pair ( , ) of strategies.
Let c : E × U × V → R be the running payoff function and let λ > 0 be the discount factor. We assume that (A2) The function c is bounded, continuous and, for all x, y ∈ E and (u, v)
Without any loss of generality, we take c to be nonnegative. For
. The running costĉ in the relaxed framework is defined bŷ
Note thatĉ satisfies (A2) with
is interpreted in an analogous way. Let
The next result is helpful in defining the concept of motion in the game. To achieve this, we make the following assumption.
(A3) The semigroup {S(t)} is compact. 
Proof. Letφ
It is enough to show that for each T > 0, the sequence of nth stage trajectories, when restricted to 
Note that
where
SinceS(δ) is compact and {y k } is bounded inẼ, there exist
. Thus we have established the relative compactness of {Q(η k (·))(t)}.
Next we prove the equicontinuity of {Q(η k (·))(·)}. Let t, s ∈ [0, T ] and s < t. The case when s = 0 is trivial. Assume that 0 < s. Now for δ small enough,
where 
where C is a constant independent of k. The map t →S(t) is continuous in the uniform operator topology on (0, ∞) because {S(t)} is a compact semigroup. Thus from the above, we get the equicontinuity of {Q(η k (·))(·)}.
We now define the concept of motion. Let {x 0n } be a sequence converging to x 0 and let {(u n (·), v n (·))} be the sequence of nth stage outcomes corresponding to the pair of strategies ( , ). By Lemma 2.1, the sequence of nth stage trajectories {φ(·, x 0n , u n (·), v n (·))} is relatively compact in C([0, ∞);Ẽ). We define a motion to be the local uniform limit of a subsequence of a sequence of nth stage trajectories.
A motion is denoted byφ[·,
As above,
. If the initial point 
, we mean the trajectory
To complete the description of the game, we need to define the payoff. The payoff associated with the pair of strategies ( , ) is set valued and is given by
The player 1 tries to choose so as to maximize all elements of P (x 0 , , ) and player 2 tries to choose so as to minimize all elements of P (x 0 , , ). This gives rise to the upper and lower value functions which are respectively given by 
is a saddle point, then P (x 0 , * , * ) is singleton and Constant component strategies and constant strategies for player 2 are defind in a similar fashion. In view of Lemma 2.1, the following result may be obtained by modifying the arguments in [1] . Hence we omit the proof.
Lemma 2.2. Assume (A1)-(A3).
(i) Let x 0 ∈ E,¯ be a constant strategy corresponding toū(·) ∈ U and let be any strategy for player 2. Then for any motionφ[·,
(ii) For any 0 < t < ∞ and constant strategy¯ , the set
Analogous results hold with¯ , replaced respectively by¯ , .
Dynamic programming and viscosity solution
Before proving the dynamic programming inequalities, we show the continuity properties of W + and W − . To this end, we first compare the trajectories with different initial points.
Lemma 3.1. Assume (A1) and (A2). For any
From this, it follows by using Gronwall inequality that
We have
Henceforth we take α 
Proof. Consider a motionφ[·, x 0 , , ] and without any loss of generality let it be the local uniform limit of a sequence {φ(·, x 0n , u n (·), v n (·))} of nth stage trajectories. Letφ[·, y 0 , , ] be the local uniform limit of a subsequence
} of nth stage trajectories. From Lemma 3.1, it follows that for t > 0,
Letting k → ∞, we get
The required result now follows by lettiong t ↑ ∞ in the above inequality. . For x 0 ∈ E and 0 < t < ∞,
Proof. Take an arbitraryū(·) ∈ U and keep it fixed. It is enough to show that
Therefore for eachx ∈ E 0 , there exists a strategy (x) such that for all ,
Let δ(x) > 0 be such that whenever x −ỹ < δ(x),
Now E 0 is compact (by Lemma 2.2 (ii)) and the collection {B(x, δ(x)) :
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In order to prove (3.3), it is sufficient to construct a strategyˆ with the property that for all and all motionsφ[·,
We first defineˆ . Let (i) = { i,n } be the sequence of partitions associated with (x i ); i = 1, 2, · · · , k. Let n be the refinement of 1,n , 2,n , · · · , k,n . Let n be the partition of [0, ∞) such that t is a partition point, [0, t] is partitioned into n equal intervals and the interval [t, ∞) is partitioned by the translation of n to the right by t. We take = { n } to be the sequence of partitions associated withˆ = {ˆ n }.
. ).
For i = 1, . . . , n, defineˆ n,i to be the map which always selectsū(·) on
) and j the least integer such thatφ(t) ∈ B(x j , δ(x j )). We then takeˆ n,i to be n (x j ) in the following sense.
Let j,n = {0 = τ i 0 < τ i 1 < · · · }. Let u n,i 1 (·) be the control that n,1 (x j ) selects on [τ i 0 , τ i 1 ). For any i such that n < i ≤ n+i 1 , the mapˆ n,i selects u n,i 1 
, then for i with n + i 1 < i ≤ n + i 2 , the mapˆ n,i selects u n,i 2 (·) on [τ i−1 , τ i ). Now the definition ofˆ is complete.
It remains to prove (3.5). To this end, let be any strategy for player 2, φ[·, x 0 ,ˆ , ] a motion and {(u n (·), v n (·))} the sequence of nth stage outcomes corresponding to (ˆ , ). Without any loss of generality, we assume that this motion is the uniform limit of a sequence {φ(·, x 0n , u n (·), v n (·))} of nth stage trajectories. Since u n (·) =ū(·) on [τ 0 , τ n ] = [0, t],ỹ :=φ[t, x 0 ,ˆ , )] ∈ E 0 . Let j be the smallest integer such thatỹ ∈ B(x j , δ(x j )) andỹ n := φ(t, x 0n , u n (·), v n (·)). Sinceỹ n →ỹ, for n large enough,ỹ n ∈ B(x j , δ(x j )). 
By arguing analogously, we can prove the next result.
Lemma 3.5 Assume (A1)-(A3)
. For x 0 ∈ E and 0 < t < ∞,
The strict inequality can hold in (3.2) and (3.6). The following example illustrates this fact for (3.6). 
Using dynamic programming inequalities, we next show that the upper (resp. lower) value function is a viscosity sub-(resp. super) solution of the HJI lower 348 DIFFERENTIAL GAMES FOR ABSTRACT EVOLUTION EQUATIONS (resp. upper) equation. The HJI lower and upper equations are, respectively, the following:
where for x, p ∈ E,
We take the definition of viscosity solution given by Crandall and Lions in [5] and [6] . We first recall their definition of viscosity solution. To this end, let
weakly sequentially lower semi-continuous and
A * D ∈ C(E)} G 0 := {g ∈ C 1 (E) | g(x) = ρ( x ) for some ρ ∈ C 1 (R) with ρ ≥ 0}.
Definition 3.6. An upper (resp. lower) semi-continuous function W : E → R is called a viscosity sub-(reps. super) solution of (3.7) (resp. (3.8)) if whenever
) has a local maximum (resp. minimum) at x ∈ E, we have
If W ∈ C(E) is both a viscosity subsolution and a viscosity supersolution of an equation, then we call it a viscosity solution.
Lemma 3.7. Assume (A1)-(A3). The upper value function W
+ is a viscosity subsolution of (3.7) and the lower value function W − is a viscosity supersolution of (3.8).
Proof. We prove that W + is a viscosity subsolution of (3.7). The other part can be proved in a similar fashion. Let ∈ S 0 , g ∈ G 0 and let x 0 be a local maximum of W + − −g. Without any loss of generality we assume that
and g(x 0 ) = 0. We need to show that
Fix an arbitraryv ∈ V . It is enough to show that
Let > 0. By Lemma 3.5, for each t > 0, there exists µ t (·) ∈Ũ such that
Hence for small enough t,
[ (ψ t (t)) + g(ψ t (t))].
This implies that for t small enough,
It can be shown that (see e.g., Lemmas 3.3, 3.4 in pp. 240-241, [10] ) for t small enough, Combining (3.10), (3.11), (3.12), (3.13) and letting t → 0, we get
Since is arbitrary, we get the required inequality (3.9).
We next show the existence of value and characterize it as the unique viscosity solution of the associated HJI equation. To achieve this we make the following assumption. Let |x| 2 B = Bx, x and F , the class of all bounded functions W : E → R with the property that for all x, y ∈ E, |W (x) − W (y)| ≤ w(|x − y| B ) for some modulus w. We shall prove the characterization in this class F . Note that the class F is contained in the class of bounded uniformly continuous functions.
We also require the so called Isaacs min-max condition. By 'local game' at (x,p) ∈Ẽ ×Ẽ, we mean the zero-sum static game, in which player 1 is the minimizer and player 2 the maximizer, with payoff u, v) . The Isaacs condition is that for each (x,p) ∈Ẽ ×Ẽ, the associated local game has a saddle point. In other words, we assume that
Remark 3.8. In (A4) it is enough to take p 0 = ±1. For proving the existence of value, we only need (A4) with p 0 = +1. But in the next Section we want 
(by Cauchy-Schwartz inequality).
It can be shown that (see e.g., Lemma 2.5, p. 233 in [10] )
for some constant C. Therefore, we obtain
This implies that we can choose δ = δ( ) > 0 such that |φ
Hence there is a modulus w with the property that |φ 
Saddle point
Under the Isaacs condition (A4), we prove the existence of a saddle point for the game. To achieve this we use only the dynamic programming inequalities in Section 3. We don't use the fact that the game has a value. Fix an arbitrary x 0 ∈ E. Let r 0 = W − (x 0 ) and r
and, by the continuity of W + and W − , the sets C(r 0 ) and C(r 0 ) are closed.
The next two results are very crucial in constructing the optimal strategies. These results follow respectively from Lemmas 3.4 and 3.5.
Proof. Suppose that the result is not true. Then there exist (t,x) ∈ C(r 0 ),
That is,
This together with Lemma 2.2 (ii) implies that
Applying Lemma 3.4, we obtain
This contradicts the fact that (t,x) ∈ C(r 0 ).
In an analogous manner, by using Lemmas 2.2 (ii) and 3.5, we can establish the next result. 
We now define extremal strategies and, using Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2, show that they constitute a saddle point. Any sequence F = {F n }, F n : [0, ∞) × [0, ∞) × E → U , defines a strategy = (F ) for player 1 in the following way. We take the nth stage partition n = {0 = t 0 < t 1 < · · · } to be the one which divides [0, ∞) into subintervals of length
for player 2 is defined in an analogous manner. The strategies (F ) and (G) are referred to as feedback strategies associated with F and G respectively. The optimal strategies e and e which we define now are of this feedback form. That is, e = (F e ) and e = (G e ). We define the sequence G e = {G en } and the definition of F e = {F en } is similar.
We then define G en (t,x) to be v * , where (u * , v * ) is a saddle point for the local game at (x,x −ỹ).
The next result compares trajectories governed by two special pairs controls. The proof may be obtained by modifying the proof of the analogous finite dimensional result in [9] . 
Clearly for each t, n (t) → (t) as n → ∞. Therefore it suffices to show that for all t > 0, lim n→∞ n (t) = 0. Fix t > 0 and an integer N > t. We now estimate n (t).
Let¯ n = {0 = τ n,0 < τ n,1 < · · · < τ n,Nn = N < · · · } be the nth stage partition associated with e . Let t ∈ (τ n,j , τ n,j +1 ], 0 ≤ j ≤ Nn−1. Chooseỹ ∈ C τ n,j (r 0 ) such that φ n (τ n,j ) −ỹ ≤ 2 1 2n n (τ n,j ). Let (u * , v * ) be a saddle point for the local game at (φ n (τ n,j ),φ n (τ n,j ) −ỹ). Now by Lemma 4.1, there exists ν(·) ∈Ṽ [τ n,j , t] such that the relaxed trajectoryψ(·) =ψ(·, τ n,j ,ỹ, u * , ν(·)) has the property that (t,ψ(t)) ∈ C(r 0 ). Therefore n (t) ≤ φ (t, τ n,j ,φ n (τ n,j ), u n (·), v * ) −ψ(t) . Letting n → ∞, we get the desired result.
Applying Lemma 4.3, we get
Similarly, we can prove the next result. The required result now follows.
Conclusions
We have extended the Berkovitz's framework to study infinite horizon discounted problems. In this setup, following a dynamic programming approach, we have shown that the two player zero-sum infinite dimensional differential game on the infinite horizon with discounted payoff has a value. This value function is then characterized as the unique viscosity solution of the associated HJI equation. This has been achieved by using the notion of viscosity solution proposed by Crandall-Lions in [5] and [6] . By using our dynamic programming inequalities and mimicking the arguments in [8] , without using (A0), we can also characterize the value function in the class of bounded uniformly continuous functions by taking the definition of viscosity solution as in [7] which is a refinement of Tataru's notion (see [11] and [12] ). In the Elliott-Kalton framework, this has been established by Kocan et. al. [8] under more general assumptions on A.
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